This study assesses the usefulness of money for policy in the Philippines. The basic idea behind the use of monetary aggregates for policy is that observed fluctuations in money anticipate movements in the ultimate objective of monetary policy, such as inflation control. The paper examines the stability of key empirical relationships, including the behavior of velocity and the presence of cointegrating relationships among money and variables of interest to policymakers. In general, results indicate that the stability of velocity and the presence of cointegrating relationships lend some limited support to the potential usefulness of money for policy. The ability of money to predict inflation is examined using Granger causality tests and an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) that examines the relative contribution of innovations in money to the variance of the forecast errors in inflation. In general, money's ability to predict inflation is less clear-cut and seems to be dependent on the ordering and lag lengths of the variables used in the VAR and the definition of money used.
Introduction
The Philippine central bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), abandoned monetary targeting and shifted to inºation targeting in 2002. Inºation targeting involves adjusting a policy instrument, such as an interest rate, to respond directly to deviations of expected inºation from its target, rather than achieving a desired inºation rate by meeting a monetary target. At the time of the announcement of the change in 2000, it was unclear whether there were cogent reasons for the shift or whether this move was simply a bandwagon effect following what other countries such as South Korea and Thailand had done. Monetary policy in the Philippines had, in principle, been anchored on monetary targeting to control inºation since the 1980s. The Philippines, like Thailand, previously targeted base money by setting a ºoor for foreign reserves and a ceiling on net domestic assets. In practice, however, evidence points to previous attempts by monetary authorities to simultaneously maintain a stable and typically overvalued peso. This practice was not unique to the Philippines. In general, monetary policy in East Asia prior to the Asian crisis in 1997 involved some combination of both monetary and exchange rate targeting.
The BSP's pursuit of multiple objectives, particularly when capital was mobile internationally, as occurred beginning in the early 1990s, and when there were possible instabilities in key empirical relationships, resulted in higher and more variable rates of inºation in the Philippines compared with many of its neighbors in East Asia (Moreno and Glick 2001, 22) . 1 In the period 1980-89, for example, the average annual inºation rate in the Philippines was 13.3 percent with a standard deviation of 11.2 percent-the Philippines was the only country in this particular group to have double-digit ªgures. The next-worst performer, Indonesia, had an annual average rate of inºation in the same period of 9.1 percent with a standard deviation of 3.5 percent. In the period 1990-2000, the annual average inºation rate in the Philippines was 8.0 percent with a standard deviation of 3.3 percent. While these ªgures are an improvement, the Philippines' record remains the second-worst performance for countries in the sample after Indonesia, whose average annual rate of inºation increased to 12.0 percent with a standard deviation of 11.9 percent.
The literature on the macroeconomic policy role of monetary aggregates "has waxed and waned in terms of an almost exclusive focus on them to complete disregard" (Estrella and Mishkin 1997, 279) . The basic idea behind the use of monetary aggregates for policy is that observed ºuctuations in money anticipate movements in the ultimate objective of monetary policy, such as inºation or output (Y) growth. Whether this is indeed so is an empirical question. Monetary aggregates may have a role, at the very least, as information variables to guide the conduct of monetary policy.
Even if movements in money do not always signal future movements in prices and output, however, monetary authorities could still use the information contained in unexpected movements in money growth in the policymaking process in a ºexible way, rather than as a strict target variable, and decide by how much to change the instrument variable (Friedman and Kuttner 1996, 94) . The assumption is that unexpected ºuctuations in money allow policymakers to anticipate and provide information about unobserved movements in prices, real output, or both. Hence, monetary authorities will change their instrument variable to counter such aberrant deviations of money and restore money to its designated path.
In the context of the Philippines and other countries in the region, several factors may have complicated the conduct of monetary policy through their potential to affect the stability of key empirical relationships. These include (1) ªnancial or technological developments that have created close substitutes for money that affect the elasticity of money demand and the ability of monetary authorities to control money; (2) large capital inºows, such as occurred in the early 1990s, and reversals during the Asian crisis, which may affect velocity, inºation, and output, especially given the limited ability of monetary authorities to sterilize capital inºows; (3) changes in inºationary expectations that could affect velocity; and (4) the effect of ªnancial crises on the availability of capital from banks versus non-bank ªnancial institutions and on velocity.
This study assesses the usefulness of money for policy in the Philippines. The ªrst section of the paper brieºy discusses the conduct of monetary policy in the Philippines. The second section examines the stability of empirical relationships over time, especially the behavior of velocity. The methodology employed uses a Markov switching technique to detect where the most likely breaks in velocity occurred and whether the smoothed probabilities of these switches from one growth state to another are signiªcant. Next, whether a stable relationship exists between money and variables of interest to policymakers in the sense of these variables' being cointegrated with one another is examined. If variables are cointegrated, then there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship among them so that the system brings these variables back to trend after a shock. In the third section, both Granger causality tests and a variance decomposition of inºation using an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) are used to examine the ability of money to predict inºation. The summary and conclusions of the study are in the ªnal section.
The monetary framework in the Philippines in the 1980s and 1990s 2
Under the monetarist framework that formed the basis of the IMF's ªnancial programming approach, including its program with the Philippine government, con-trolling the growth of the money supply was the key to controlling inºation. This was the basic approach that had been in use in the Philippines since the mid-1980s.
Consider the quantity theory of money (QTM) equation of exchange, MV ϭ PY, where M is the stock of money, V is the income velocity of money, P is the price level, and Y is the level of real income or output. Given target values for the rate of inºation, real GNP growth, and estimates of the income velocity of money, the rate of growth of the money supply (M) can then be derived (residually) to ensure equilibrium in the money market.
Base money (BM) is related to M via the money multiplier; that is,
Given the money multiplier, once M is known from the simple QTM equation of exchange, BM can be used to meet the target M.
Hence, there are two key relationships to controlling inºation. These are (1) the relationship between the intermediate target, or M, and inºation and (2) the relationship between the operating target, or BM, and the intermediate target, M. The BSP used M3, a broad measure of money, as its intermediate target.
Casual empirical observations suggest that over the period 1980-91, the Philippine central bank was not engaged in strict monetary aggregate targeting. Rather, exchange rate targeting was practiced in conjunction with an output growth objective. The central bank used its foreign reserves to keep the target exchange rate within a narrow band. In addition, the ªnancing of persistent public sector deªcits added to the difªculty of meeting monetary targets.
These multiple objectives gave rise to an inºation and output growth performance during the period 1980-91 that left much to be desired. Both the ªnancing of the public sector deªcit and the collapse of the peso led to excessive money creation and to very high rates of inºation. Erratic monetary policy produced wild swings in the inºation rate, marked by episodes of double-digit inºation lasting for 2-3 years. From 1983 to 1985, for instance, inºation was exceedingly high, reaching a peak of about 42 percent in 1984. The monetary authorities responded by severely contracting money and driving domestic interest rates to historically high levels.
Growth in real GDP was also uneven during the period 1980-91. The monetary contraction used to quell inºation in the early 1980s led to a major recession that lasted for 2 years , the ªrst in the postwar economic history of the Philippines, following the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 and the moratorium on external debt service beginning in 1984. In 1991, there was another recession, albeit milder than the one in the early 1980s.
The collapse of the central bank's defense of the peso, particularly in 1983, was extremely costly to the economy. The central bank incurred large losses. Between 1983 and 1986, these losses hampered the central bank's ability to conduct monetary policy. These losses were hidden in so-called suspense accounts in the books of the central bank. By the end of 1986, the balance on these suspense accounts amounted to approximately P170 billion, with counterpart liabilities of a corresponding amount (Paderanga 1996, 2) . The servicing of these liabilities implied a continuous injection of money into the economy. Under the IMF program with monetary targets, these injections of money then had to be mopped up by the ºotation of Treasury bills whose proceeds were immediately deposited with the central bank to prevent inºationary effects.
The Philippines made a modest re-entry into international capital markets with a series of reschedulings of Paris Club debt beginning in 1985 and the implementation of a debt-to-equity program beginning in 1986. The country agreed to a 2-year IMF program beginning in 1986. Only in the early 1990s was the country able to ºoat bonds and some international equity issues, and it has yet to get back to an investment-grade credit rating from international credit-rating agencies.
In 1992, the foreign-exchange market was liberalized. This entailed the elimination of restrictions in the current account and greatly diminished restrictions on capital ºows. Capital ºows showed particularly large increases in 1993 and 1994 and rose dramatically in 1996, right before the Asian crisis. As a percentage of GDP, capital inºows rose from 1.23 percent of GDP in 1988 to 3.43 percent in 1989, and then to 6.85 percent in 1991. In 1994, these inºows surged once more to 7.4 percent of GDP, and by 1996 to about 10 percent of GDP before the massive retreat of capital in 1997 (Gochoco-Bautista and Canlas 2003, 87) . Portfolio inºows, in particular, increased and exceeded direct investment ºows in the third quarter of 1989 for the ªrst time. It bears emphasizing, however, that the size of capital inºows to the Philippines was smaller than those in countries such as Malaysia and Thailand and also came later.
In 1993, Republic Act No. 7653 was enacted, establishing an independent central monetary authority, the BSP (Gochoco-Bautista and Canlas 2003, 91) . The mandated duty of the BSP is to maintain price stability. The losses of the old central bank were transferred to a board of liquidators so as not to impair the functioning of new BSP. (Guinigundo 2000, 7) . 3 This approach evidently "reduces the risk of monetary policy being either too tight or too loose, as may happen with strict adherence to a traditional base money program" (Guinigundo 2000, 7) .
Certain key modiªcations were introduced into the monetary targeting framework over the next 4 years and are covered in so-called adjustment clauses in the agreement with the IMF.
1. It appears that the main change is that the modiªed framework allows base money (BM) levels to go beyond target as long as the inºation targets are met. As Guinigundo states, "As long as inºation adheres to the program monthly path, the base money limits are automatically increased by the amount of the excess of net international reserves over the program targets. This provides an automatic mechanism for the BSP to respond to unexpected increases in the real demand for money coming from improvements in the external sector of the economy" (Guinigundo 2000, 7) . 2. "An excess of one or more percentage points of inºation over the program induces a mopping up operation by the BSP to bring down base money to the previous month's level. If actual inºation exceeds targets for three consecutive months, then the entire monetary program is reviewed" (Guinigundo 2000, 7) .
What are the differences between this modiªed framework, minus the adjustment clauses, and the original monetary targeting framework? Under the modiªed framework, base money automatically increases when there are capital inºows that tend to raise net international reserves. No sterilization measures are undertaken to reduce the expansionary effect on the money supply. By not countering this expansionary effect on money arising from capital inºows, as long as inºation is below target, the BSP passively adapts to what is happening to the money supply as a result of capital inºows. It appears that a more ºexible approach to monetary targeting was practiced.
When inºation is higher than target for 3 months, the authorities go into high gear. They undertake a "mopping up operation to bring down base money to the previous month's level if there is an excess of one or more percentage points of inºation over the program" (Guinigundo 2000, 7) . In fact, if "actual inºation exceeds targets for three consecutive months, then the entire monetary program is reviewed." It appears that while inºation targets are "hard" targets, BM targets are not.
Conversations with monetary ofªcials also seem to conªrm that the BM targets are not really "hard" targets. It is said that the very high ceilings on BM are set to give the authorities a lot of leeway. The modiªed framework was further revised to place a limit on the amount of allowable adjustment in the base money ceilings if there was a large income in the BSP holdings of net international reserves (NIR), as there was beginning in 1994. In particular, BM limits would be increased by the full amount of the ªrst US$500 million of increase over the NIR target, translated into pesos at the average exchange rate prevailing in the month concerned, and by half of any additional overperformance (Guinigundo 2000) . This means that the authorities would not sterilize capital inºows, simply raise their BM target, and accept the increase in BM in the relevant period, but the increase in BM would be limited to the ªrst US$500 million over the NIR ceilings and then by half that amount for succeeding capital inºows. Guinigundo further states, "Limiting the allowable adjustment in base money ceilings on account of capital inºows was another step towards greater emphasis on reining inºation through controlling money growth" (Guinigundo 2000, 7) .
The stability of empirical relationships

The behavior of the income velocity of money
We examine the behavior of the income velocity of money, that is, the ratio of nominal GDP to money, as signiªcant breaks in its trend may lead to a breakdown in the relationship between money, prices, and output. The empirical analysis involves estimating the stochastic trend of velocity using a Markov regime-switching methodology and examining the smoothed probabilities of changes in velocity. 4 The model is a two-state Markov regime-switching model that endogenously determines structural breaks in the velocity of money using a generalized Hamilton model due to Lam (1990) and implemented by Kim and Nelson (1999) In this study, we examine the behavior of M1, M3, and RM velocity. There are several reasons for the use of different measures of money. First, the factors cited earlier that might have affected the stability of velocity's trend might have done so to varying degrees depending on the measure of money used. The impact of capital ºow volatility, for example, most directly affects base money and may give independent information on monetary conditions. Second, the choice of the particular monetary aggregate to use for policy is an empirical issue. In theory, a narrower monetary aggregate would be assumed to have a closer link to inºation, because narrow money is held primarily for transactions purposes, whereas broader money measures partly reºect the holding of money as a store of wealth. Some empirical studies have validated the usefulness of targeting a relatively narrow monetary aggregate. Gochoco (1993) , for example, ªnds that only M1 is cointegrated with interest rates, output, and the exchange rate. Guinigundo's (2000) study likewise implies that narrower monetary aggregates are to be preferred as targets because broader aggregates tend to adjust more slowly toward equilibrium after a shock (Guinigundo 2000, 11) .
Despite such evidence, however, the BSP used M3 or total liquidity as its intermediate target until the shift to inºation targeting. In order to have control over its intermediate target, the BSP has an operating target with which to affect M3. The BSP's operating target was base money, deªned as reserve money plus reserve-eligible government securities, liquidity reserves, and reserve deªciency. 5 RM represents liabilities of the central bank and consists of currency in circulation and reserve deposits of banks and other deposit-taking non-bank ªnancial intermediaries.
The log of the velocity of money, or the ratio of nominal GDP to money, is obtained for each of the three measures of money. Results of the adjusted Dickey-Fuller tests in table 1 indicate that the log level of velocity is nonstationary and its ªrst-difference is stationary. This means that the velocity of money is an I(1) variable. For the Markov regime-switching methodology, the log level of the velocity of money is used, as it is nonstationary. Figure 1 shows the plots of the smoothed probability of a low-growth state, the actual and estimated stochastic trend, and the cyclical component or the difference between the actual and estimated stochastic trend, for each of the three measures of velocity of money as well as other variables. In general, the stochastic trends of velocity using both M1 and M3 show a decline from the mid-1980s to the more recent period. This is consistent with the growing monetization of the economy. Annual average rates of inºation had fallen to 8 percent in the period 1990-2000 from 13.3 percent in the period 1980-90 (Moreno and Glick 2001, 22) . 6 The stochastic trend of M1 velocity is declining, particularly from 1987:Q1 to 1999:Q4, a period in which there is apparently no break in the stochastic trend of M1 velocity and a high probability of a low-growth state. It is also a period in which the probability of a lowgrowth state for M1 itself is generally low. Similarly, the stochastic trend of M3 velocity is declining from 1989:Q1 to 1997:Q4, a period in which the probability of a low-growth state for M3 velocity is likewise high, with no signiªcant break in its stochastic trend. It is also a period in which the probability of a low-growth state for M3 is low, except for around 1992. Hence, over time, M1 and M3 velocity exhibited declining stochastic trends and stability, as there were no signiªcant stochastic trend breaks. The possible exceptions to this are the early 1980s, during which the country experienced its worst postwar economic crisis, and around 2000 under the Estrada administration, which was ousted shortly thereafter in the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue II revolution of January 2001.
The behavior of RM velocity, for which data start in 1985, is different from the cases above as it exhibits no consistent trend over time. The stochastic trend of RM velocity shows a signiªcant break around 1994, from a steeply declining trend in the mid-1980s to early 1990s. 7 After 1994, the stochastic trend of RM velocity reverses and begins to rise. After liberalizing the foreign exchange market in 1992, the Philippines experienced its most intense period of capital inºows between 1994 and 1996, with capital inºows amounting to 10 percent of GDP in 1996 (Gochoco-Bautista and Canlas 2001) . In the period from 1990 to 1996, total capital inºows averaged 6.6 percent of GDP, compared with only 2.3 percent in the period from 1985 to 1989 (Moreno and Glick 2001, 21) . Beginning in about 1994, or prior to the Asian crisis, the monetary authorities attempted to sterilize these inºows. Unlike Moreno and Glick's results (2001, 10) , ours indicate that rising capital inºows, particularly around 1994, are seemingly associated with a break in the behavior of RM velocity. The log of the nominal exchange rate (pesos per dollar) had a very low probability of low growth in 1994, but this had been the case since 1991 and remained the case until the crisis in 1997. Thus, it appears that exchange rate movements cannot be used to explain the change in the trend of RM velocity around 1994.
Apparently, the behavior of RM velocity is being driven largely by the behavior of RM itself, whose stochastic trend shifted downward around this period and whose smoothed probability also showed a change in 1994. The probability of a lowgrowth state for the log of RM became very high beginning in 1994, in contrast to the earlier period. The probability of a low-growth state remained high for nominal output throughout.
It is less difªcult to explain an increase in velocity, as domestic currency tends to be disposed of when capital inºows reverse, as they did during the Asian crisis and its immediate aftermath. Lower inºation volatility would also be expected to increase velocity to the extent that it reduces the need to hold precautionary balances. Another possible reason for the increase in velocity especially during or after the crisis would be that monetary authorities did not provide liquidity injections to banks and available capital was reduced as ªrms shifted away from credit-constrained banks.
There is some evidence that monetary authorities in the Philippines chose not to provide greater liquidity to banks during the crisis and in its immediate aftermath (Gochoco-Bautista and Bautista 2005) .
Cointegration
Cointegration is useful in testing for the presence of equilibrium relationships among variables so that a shock will not allow variables to trend away from each other. 8 The cointegration procedure used here is the Johansen method. 9 The two tests for detecting cointegration are the trace test and the eigenvalue test.
Three different models are used: the ªrst model (two-variable) includes logs of money and the price level; the second model (three-variable) includes the logs of money, the price level, and real output; the third model (four-variable) includes the logs of money, the price level, real output, and the exchange rate. As usual, three different measures of money are used, and the estimation is carried out over the fullperiod sample, selected subperiods, and pre-and post-Asian crisis periods. The selected periods are those in which a particular measure of income velocity of money is relatively stable, in the sense of the absence of a stochastic trend break. They are the following: 1987:Q1 to 1999:Q4 for M1, 1989:Q1 to 1997:Q4 for M3, and 1986:Q2 to 1992:Q4 for RM. The idea for using these selected subperiods is to determine whether the stability of velocity matters for cointegration or not.
The results of the tests for cointegration are shown in table 2. The numbers in the table indicate the number of cointegrating vectors found. The full-period results show that among the three measures of money, M1 and RM, and hence narrower measures of money, are cointegrated with either the log of the price level or the logs of both the price level and real output. When the model includes the exchange rate, only when RM is used is there a cointegrating relationship among all the variables.
Hence, as far as the full-sample results are concerned, RM is the only measure of money that is consistently cointegrated with the other variables.
When selected periods are used, there are a few differences. In those cases, M1 is not cointegrated with either the price level or both the price level and real output. However, all three measures of money display cointegrating relationships using the fourvariable model (i.e., money, inºation, output, and exchange rate). The results for the selected subperiods also show that the four-variable model is the best model. Again, however, RM displays consistent cointegration with the other variables regardless of the model used.
For the pre-Asian crisis period, there is much evidence of cointegration across different measures of money and different models. Only M3 in a three-variable model shows no cointegrating relationship. Once again, the results show that the fourvariable model is the best model and that RM shows consistent cointegration with the other variables regardless of the model used.
It is only in the post-Asian crisis period that different results from the previous ones are obtained. RM is no longer cointegrated with the other variables in the two-and three-variable models but continues to be cointegrated with both variables and the exchange rate in the four-variable model. M1 is no longer cointegrated with inºation in the two-variable model. Surprisingly, M3 is now cointegrated with the other variables across models.
To summarize, the cointegration results, in general, show that a four-variable model is better than the other models; narrower measures of money, particularly RM, generally tend to display more cointegrating relationships with other variables relative to other measures of money; in the pre-Asian crisis period, money generally displays a cointegrating relationship with other variables in more cases, whereas in the post-Asian crisis period, only M3, a broader measure of money, does so consistently across models.
The ªnding of cointegration between a broader measure of money and other variables in the post-Asian crisis period is unlike Moreno and Glick's (2001, 19) result for South Korea. They surmise that the development of alternatives to money has not been great enough to destabilize the relationship between the narrower deªnition of money and inºation. Nevertheless, as is true of their results, money generally displays a stable relationship with inºation and other variables in the 1990s.
Does money predict inºation and output?
Granger causality tests
The simplest tests relating the information content of money to inºation or output involve bivariate Granger causality tests. In carrying out the Granger causality tests, the ªrst-differences of the logs of the variables are used as unit-root tests to indicate that the variables are stationary in ªrst-difference form. Hence, the full-sample results indicate that whereas M1 growth Granger-causes output growth, it does not directly Granger-cause inºation. Rather, both output growth and currency depreciation Granger-cause inºation.
When the early 1980s crisis period is excluded, so that the sample period is 1987:Q1 to 2003:Q4, the following results are obtained:
•
The only difference here from the full-sample results is that M3 growth Grangercauses both inºation and output growth. This is the only instance in which any measure of money is found to Granger-cause inºation. It differs from the results obtained by Moreno and Glick (2001, 14) , in which both base money and M2 help predict inºation prior to 1990 and also have highly signiªcant results during the Asian crisis period.
For RM growth, Granger causality was tested pre-and post-1994, when velocity had apparently experienced a trend break. Over the period from 1981:Q1 to 1993:Q4, the results are as follows:
• Inºation 3 output growth • Output growth 3 inºation For the post-1994 period using RM, no signiªcant Granger causal relationships are found. For the pre-Asian crisis period of 1981:Q1 to 1997:Q2, the following result is obtained:
• Depreciation 3 inºation For the post-Asian crisis period of 1997:Q3 to 2003:Q4, the following results are obtained:
• Inºation 3 depreciation • Depreciation 3 inºation Hence, if the sample is broken around the time of the Asian crisis, inºation is Granger-caused by currency depreciation only, one of the results also obtained using the full sample.
In general, the results across different measures of money indicate that output growth Granger-causes inºation, except if the sample period is broken around 1997, in which case currency depreciation Granger-causes inºation. However, money growth, using either M1 or M3 growth, is also generally found to Granger-cause output growth. M3 growth and currency depreciation sometimes directly Grangercause inºation.
Variance decomposition
Another way to assess the predictive content of money and its importance in explaining inºation is to examine the contribution of orthogonalized innovations in money to the variance of the forecast error in inºation using a standard unrestricted VAR methodology. These orthogonalized innovations are obtained by applying a Choleski decomposition to the variance-covariance matrix of residuals of the model, with inºation ordered ªrst and other variables successively added in the different models used. In the two-variable model, inºation is ordered ªrst and money growth is ordered second; in the three-variable model, real output growth is added to these and ordered third; and in the four-variable model, the depreciation rate is added to these and ordered last. Uniforms lags of four are used for each of the variables in the models. The models are estimated using the ªrst-differences of the logs of the variables. Table 3 shows the percentage of the variance of the forecast error in inºation explained by innovations in money and the two other variables using the different models over full and sub-period samples. The entries in the columns show the largest contribution of orthogonalized innovations in money and the two other variables in explaining the variance of the forecast error in inºation over a seven-period horizon.
The full-sample results show that when only money innovations are used to explain the variance of the forecast error in inºation, only 4 to 5 percent of the latter is explained. In the three-variable model with output growth, output growth explains more of the variance of the forecast error in inºation, especially when the measure of money used is RM growth. Innovations in money growth, regardless of the measure of money used, explain only between 3 and 5 percent of the variance of the forecast error in inºation. When the four-variable model including currency deprecia-tion is used, the latter explains a greater proportion (12 percent and 15 percent) of the variance of the forecast error in inºation, except when RM growth is used as the measure of money. These results are compatible with the earlier ªndings of both real output growth and currency depreciation Granger-causing inºation using the full sample. When innovations in RM growth are used in the four-variable model, output growth explains 12 percent of the variance of the forecast error in inºation, whereas money only explains 2 percent. Although these results are compatible with the earlier ªnding of cointegration among the variables using a four-variable model and RM growth, they imply that innovations in money growth, regardless of the measure of money used, explain only a small proportion of the variance of the forecast error in inºation over the entire sample period.
Unrestricted VARs were also estimated over selected periods in which income velocity for each of the three measures of money was relatively stable based on their stochastic trends. These periods are also listed in table 3. For M3 in particular, and to some degree RM, the contribution of innovations in money growth to explaining the variance of the forecast error in inºation are much higher than those obtained using the full-period sample. These results seem to conªrm the notion that when velocity is relatively stable, as it is in these selected periods, money will have a more direct role in explaining inºation. Only innovations in M1 growth fare less well when compared with the results for M1 in the full sample. In the three-variable model, innovations in M3 growth dominate those in output growth in explaining the variance of the forecast error in inºation. However, in the four-variable model, output growth innovations, rather than those in money growth, are the dominant contributors to the variance of the forecast error in inºation, except in the case of M3, in which innovations in currency depreciation are dominant. When RM growth is used in the four-variable model, innovations in RM growth dominate innovations in currency depreciation but amount to only about one-third of the effect of output growth innovations. Hence, in general, innovations in money growth are not the dominant factor explaining the variance of the forecast error in inºation.
In the pre-Asian crisis period, innovations in money are generally dominated by those in currency depreciation using M1 and M3, or output growth using RM growth. In the post-Asian crisis period, the highest contributions of money growth innovations to the variance of the forecast error in inºation are obtained (e.g., 26 percent for M3 growth in the three-variable model), compared with other subperiods or the full sample. M1 growth innovations actually dominate output growth innovations in the three-variable model. Innovations in currency depreciation dominate the other variables in a four-variable model using M1 or M3. Output growth innovations dominate RM growth innovations in explaining the variance of the forecast error in inºation in the four-variable model, but not by much (23 percent versus 19 percent).
In general, innovations in money growth are not the dominant contributors to the variance of the forecast errors in inºation from the perspective of the full sample and different subperiods. Innovations in currency depreciation generally are the most important contributors. This is consistent with the earlier ªndings of Granger causality between currency depreciation and real output growth Granger-causing inºation. In the post-Asian crisis period, innovations in money growth seem gener-ally to account for a larger share of the variance of the forecast errors in inºation compared with those in the pre-Asian crisis period.
Sensitivity tests
The variance decomposition results in the previous section were subjected to sensitivity tests to determine whether they are robust with respect to changes in the number of lags and the ordering of the variables used. The original ordering of the variables put inºation ªrst, followed by money growth, real output growth, and ªnally, the currency depreciation rate, using different types of models (i.e., two-, three-, or four-variable). In this section, different lag lengths and an alternative ordering of the variables are used. Tables 4 and 5 show the results obtained using the original ordering, in which inºation is ordered ªrst before money growth and the other variables, but three and ªve lags of the variables are used, respectively. The results using these different lag lengths are presented in boldface in the tables, and the original results with four lags are found next to them.
The results in table 4 using three lags show no major differences from the original ones using four lags for the full period. For the selected periods, and the pre-and post-Asian crisis periods, in general, the proportion of the variance of the forecast errors in inºation explained by innovations in money growth declines. In some cases, the ranking of the different variables in terms of the proportion explained changes somewhat. In the four-variable model using M1 growth, for example, innovations in currency depreciation now dominate compared with innovations in output growth originally. Innovations in M3 growth are about as important as those in currency depreciation when M3 growth is used.
The results for the pre-Asian crisis period are essentially the same as the original ones except for the smaller proportions of the forecast variance of inºation explained by money growth. In the post-Asian crisis period, however, the proportions of the forecast variance of inºation explained by any measure of money growth decline dramatically, except in one case in which the proportion increases. In the postAsian crisis period, which includes the Asian crisis period, the differences in the two sets of results are quite large. Nevertheless, between the pre-and post-Asian crisis periods, the proportion of the forecast variance explained by money growth in the latter is larger than in the former, a result similar to the original ones in which four lags are used. In general, therefore, when three rather than four lags are used, the proportion of the forecast variance of inºation explained by innovations in money growth is smaller. Table 5 shows the results obtained when ªve rather than four lags are used. The results show that when more lags are used, the proportion of the forecast variance in inºation explained by money growth increases in most cases. The full-period results do not show very large differences except in the case of RM growth. When a threevariable model is used, innovations in RM growth explain 16.30 percent of the variance of the forecast error in inºation compared with 4.54 percent previously. There is a slight change in the ranking of output growth innovations and those in currency depreciation in the four-variable model.
For the selected periods, there are dramatic increases in the proportion of the variance of inºation explained by innovations in RM growth. In the four-variable model, this proportion rises to 43.86 percent from 10.60 originally, and RM becomes the variable whose innovations account for the largest proportion of the variance in inºation.
For the pre-Asian crisis period, the main difference is likewise the large increases in the proportion of the variance in inºation explained by innovations in RM growth. Again, RM is the variable whose innovations account for the largest proportion of the variance in inºation. For the post-Asian crisis period, the same result is obtained. In the four-variable model, innovations in RM growth explain 66.21 percent of the forecast variance in inºation. In contrast to the original results, innovations in currency depreciation account for a very small proportion of the forecast variance in inºation. To summarize, when a greater number of lags such as ªve is used, the proportion of the forecast variance in inºation explained by innovations in money growth increases and those in RM growth increase dramatically and dominate the other variables in doing so. This is compatible with the earlier positive ªnding regarding cointegration among the variables in the full period regardless of the model when RM is the measure of money used.
Next, an alternative ordering in which innovations in money growth are put ªrst, followed by those in the inºation rate, real output growth, and currency depreciation is used. The results of this ordering are shown in tables 6, 7, and 8. These tables show the results using this alternative ordering when three, four, and ªve lags are used, respectively. The results are shown in boldface next to the results obtained with the same number of lags but using the original ordering in which innovations in inºation are ordered ªrst. The change in ordering reºects a change in the assumption regarding which variable is most exogenous. When innovations in money growth are ordered ªrst, by construction, it is assumed that money is the exogenous variable. Table 6 shows the results using this alternative ordering with four lags and compares it with the results using the original ordering. For the full period, there is only one striking difference. There are very large increases in the proportion of the variance of the forecast error in inºation explained by innovations in M1 growth (e.g., 34.54 percent versus 6.93 percent in the four-variable model). The rest of the results for the full period are the same. Similarly, there are no major differences in the results for the selected periods.
For the pre-Asian crisis period, again, the striking difference is the very large increases in the numbers for M1 growth (e.g., 41.49 percent versus 9.81 percent in the four-variable model). Otherwise, the rest of the results are basically the same as the original ones. For the post-Asian crisis period, there are larger numbers for M1 and M3 growth, although the change is not as dramatic as in the pre-Asian crisis case, while the numbers for RM growth are somewhat more mixed when compared with the original results. In both cases the results for the rest of the variables are largely identical with the original results. Table 7 shows the results obtained when three lags are used in conjunction with the alternative ordering versus the original ordering. Again, for the full period, the difference in the results is the large numbers for innovations in M1 growth when the alternative ordering is used. Those for RM growth likewise increase. Again, both these results seem to be compatible with the earlier ªnding of cointegration among the variables for the full period when either M1 or RM growth is used. For the selected periods, the results for innovations in M1 growth are much larger than the original results; the numbers for M3 growth decline somewhat, while those for RM growth are similar to those obtained using the original ordering.
For the pre-Asian crisis period, the previous results also apply; that is, there are large increases in the proportion of the forecast variance in inºation explained by innovations in M1 growth and to some extent, those in RM growth as well. The exception to this seems to be the innovations in M3 growth, whose numbers fall slightly. Similarly, in the post-Asian crisis period, there are large increases in the proportion of the forecast variance in inºation explained by innovations in M1 growth and to some extent, those in RM growth as well. In both periods, innovations in currency depreciation in most cases, and those in real output growth in a few cases, explain the greatest proportion of the forecast variance in inºation.
In general, therefore, when the alternative ordering and a smaller number of lags (i.e., three) are used, the most striking result is the relatively large increase in the proportion of the forecast variance in inºation explained by innovations in M1 growth. However, in no case is money growth the most important factor explaining the forecast variance in inºation. is used in conjunction with a larger number of lags (i.e., ªve). In general, the results show that the proportion of the forecast variance in inºation explained by innovations in money growth, especially those in M1 and to some extent those in RM, increases in both the full period and selected periods. As in the earlier results, when ªve lags are used, innovations in RM growth explain the largest proportion of the forecast variance in inºation. Only when M1 or M3 are used are innovations in currency depreciation the most important.
For the pre-Asian crisis period, again the striking difference is the large increases in the proportion of the forecast variance in inºation explained by innovations in M1 growth. Both innovations in M1 and RM growth now dominate the other variables when a four-variable model is used. For the post-Asian crisis period, innovations in both M3 and RM growth dominate the other variables in explaining the variance of the forecast error in inºation. This is compatible with the earlier ªnding of cointegration using these measures of money in this period. In the case of the fourvariable model, innovations in RM growth account for 68.02 percent of the variance in the forecast error in inºation.
To summarize, in general, when an alternative ordering is used in which innovations in money growth are ordered ªrst, the proportion of the variance of the forecast error in inºation explained by money increases, dramatically so for M1 growth.
Only when a higher number of lags such as ªve is used, however, do innovations in money growth, particularly those in RM growth, dominate the other variables in explaining the variance in the forecast error in inºation. Thus the ªndings generally favor the use of a greater number of lags and narrower deªnitions of money, namely, either RM growth or M1 growth.
Summary and conclusions
This study examines the usefulness of money for policy in the Philippines. The behavior of velocity was found to depend on the measure of money used. When the log of either M1 or M3 is used, velocity was found to have been generally stable over the period 1987-2000, with a declining stochastic trend. When the log of RM is used, there appears to be a signiªcant change in the smoothed probability of velocity around 1994. The trend in RM velocity is declining until about 1994, after which it increases. Nevertheless, the results show that at least some measures of money give rise to a measure of income velocity that displays a degree of stability over a fairly long period of time.
The cointegration results showed that a long-run relationship exists among the logs of money (particularly narrower deªnitions of money, especially RM), real output growth, price level, and the exchange rate. This ªnding regarding cointegration of money with other variables of interest occurred more often and across different models in the pre-Asian crisis period than in the post-Asian crisis period. In the post-Asian crisis period, RM growth was cointegrated with the other variables in the four-variable model only. Only a broader measure of money, M3, was consistently cointegrated with the other variables across models in the post-Asian crisis period.
In general, the results indicate that the stability of the behavior of velocity and of the empirical relationships involving money and other variables of interest lends some support to the potential usefulness of money for policy. However, the measure of money that gives rise to these results is not consistent. More often than not, RM is the most appropriate, especially with regard to the results of the cointegration tests, even though there appears to be a break in the stochastic trend of RM velocity around 1994. Breaking the sample around the time of the Asian crisis appears to give rise to contrasting results. Perhaps the Asian crisis shock was greater than any other event such as foreign exchange market liberalization, the growth of money substitutes, and the apparent breaks in velocity.
In terms of the ability of money to predict inºation using Granger causality tests, the results showed that in general, money growth does not directly Granger-cause inºation. Output growth does. In some periods, however, M3 does Granger-cause inºation. When the sample period is broken around the time of the Asian crisis in 1997, currency depreciation is shown to Granger-cause inºation. Hence, the Granger causality results are less favorable to the usefulness of money for predicting inºation directly, although money may affect other variables that do so.
The variance decomposition results from an unrestricted VAR in which the innovations in inºation were ordered ªrst, and one or more of the following were next (namely, money growth, then real output growth, and ªnally the depreciation rate) showed that in general, innovations in money growth are not the dominant contributors to the variance in the forecast errors in inºation (at best accounting for only about 19 percent) from the perspective of the full sample and different subperiods. Higher percentages were obtained for money growth innovations in explaining the variance in the forecast errors in inºation when the estimation was done over the periods in which income velocity was relatively stable based on the earlier results. Generally, however, innovations in output growth or in currency depreciation were found to account for most of the variance in the forecast errors in inºation. Nevertheless, innovations in RM growth seem to account for a fair amount of the variance in the forecast errors in inºation in the post-Asian crisis period, comparable to that accounted for by innovations in currency depreciation.
Sensitivity tests in which different numbers of lags and an alternative ordering of the variables were used reveal some important differences from the original results. One is that when a greater number of lags length is used, the proportion of the forecast variance in inºation explained by innovations in money growth increases. Indeed, that explained by innovations in RM growth increases dramatically and dominates the other variables in doing so. The second result is that when an alternative ordering of the variables is used in which innovations in money growth are ordered ªrst, the proportion of the forecast variance in inºation explained by innovations in M1 growth, and to some extent by those in RM growth, rises dramatically, regardless of the number of lags. Only when a greater number of lags is used in conjunction with this alternative ordering do innovations in RM growth dominate all the other variables in explaining the forecast error of the variance in inºation.
In general, other variables such as output growth and currency depreciation contain more useful information for predicting inºation than money does. More positive ªndings for money in explaining inºation are obtained when a narrower deªnition of money, more lags, and a model that also includes currency depreciation and real output growth are used. These ªndings seem to be compatible with the following implications of the quantity theory of money: (1) the relationship between the use of money as a medium of exchange rather than as a store of wealth or for precautionary demand and the rate at which price levels increase and (2) the long and variable lags of the effects of money on the economy.
Overall, therefore, the usefulness of money for controlling and predicting inºation is not a foregone conclusion. The importance of variables such as real output growth and currency depreciation in explaining inºation suggests that possibly supply side channels, in addition to demand side channels, may be important, and that the channels through which money growth affects inºation have become more complicated and less direct. As such, relying solely on monetary aggregates to predict and inºuence inºation may not be warranted.
according to a two-state Markov process, in which the binary variable, s t , represents either a high-growth state or a low-growth state of the series in question at time t. The probability that state j follows state i is given by the transition probabilities p ij ϭ Pr(s t ϭ j|s tϪ1 ϭ i) , where ⌺ j p ij ϭ 1, j ϭ 0, 1.
x t ϭ x tϪ1 ϩ 0 ϩ 1 s t , 1 Ͼ 0 .
The cycle, z t , is modeled as (L)z t ϭ ε t , ε t ϳ N(0, 2 ) .
If one of the roots of (L) ϭ 0 is unity, then x t and z t are not identiªed, and the model reverts to the original Hamilton model. Kim (1994) uses state space techniques on Lam's extension so that equation (1) is the measurement equation and equations (2) and (3) are the transition equations. His smoothing algorithm, used in this study, yields approximate maximum-likelihood estimates close to those of Lam. One of its outputs is the probability of occurrence of a state for each period given information up to the end of the sample and is known as the smoothed probability. In this study, the plot of the smoothed probability shows the probability of a low-growth state.
Appendix B
The method used in this paper to test for cointegration and estimate the cointegrating vector is the vector autoregression (VAR) maximum-likelihood technique of Johansen and Juselius (1990) . Their method analyzes the relationship amonguarterly or monthly nonstationary (I(1)) or stationary (I(0)) variables using the following VAR system:
X t is a (q, 1) vector of observations on the q variables at time t, is a (q, 1) vector of constant terms for each equation, and t is a (q, 1) vector of error terms, and i and are (q, q) matrices of coefªcients. The long-run relationships in the data are captured in the matrix. If the rank of is between 0 and q (denoted z), then there are z linear combinations of the variable in the system that are I(0) (cointegrated). In this sit-uation, can be decomposed into two (q, z) matrices and . such that ϭ Ј,
where . contains the coefªcients of the cointegrating vectors and is the matrix of coefªcients on the cointegrating vectors (speed-of-adjustment coefªcients) in each equation. The system (1) is estimated by full information maximum likelihood, to enable us to recover the coefªcients.
Johansen (1991) constructs two tests for determining the rank of , the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test. Johansen and Juselius (1990) present tables of asymptotic critical values for the two test statistics. In addition, Johansen (1991) demonstrates that tests of restrictions on the coefªcients of . have chi-squared asymptotic distributions conditional on the order of cointegration being correct.
